THU, 26 APR 2001 23:42:19 GMT
Montenegro after the Elections
Between Referendum and FRY
Djukanovic has won, but his opponents have not lost. The elections have
revealed what was already well known: there is an essential split in
Montenegrin society although the option of independent Montenegro
prevails. But the elections have not given the answer to the question of
the near future either of the state of Montenegro or the state of FRY
AIM Podgorica 24.04.2001.
AIM Podgorica, April 24, 2001
A curious, surreal picture in early morning on April 23 when the first
results of the early elections in Montenegro were already known. In the
Together for Yugoslavia coalition a cheerful atmosphere, in the
headquarters of the Victory of Montenegro a sombre silence.
The host of foreign reporters must have been greatly confused that
morning: the winners looked as if they had been defeated, and the
defeated raised their heads high. That, too, is Montenegro: the Victory
of Montenegro coalition has won but has no reason to celebrate, and the
Together for Yugoslavia coalition has lost but has much reason not to
lament.
The composition of the future Montenegrin parliament will be as
follows: Victory of Montenegro coalition (Democratic Party of Socialists
/DPS/ and Social Democratic Party /SDP/) will have 36 deputies, Together
for Yugoslavia coalition (Socialist People's Party /SNP/, People's Party
/NS/ and Serb People's Party /SNS/) 33, Liberal League 6, Democratic
Union of the Albanians and Democratic League one each.
A more detailed election statistical data are the following: Victory of
Montenegro coalition won 42.05 per cent, Together For Yugoslavia 40.67
per cent of the votes. The Liberal League of Montenegro /LSCG/ ranks
third with 7.65 per cent, while two parties which gather Montenegrin
Albanians, Democratic Union of the Albanians and the Democratic League
will be represented in the parliament although they have won only one
per cent of the votes each thanks to the fact that the election law
enables a part of the territory with a large majority Albanian
population to have its deputies in Montenegrin assembly. The People's
Socialist Party of Momir Bulatovic was on the verge of entering the
parliament: it lacked only 700 votes to achieve that. Although voting
will be repeated in three voting stations (out of the total of 1090) it
is almost impossible to believe that they will somehow make it into the
parliament. In other words, Momir Bulatovic is slowly leaving the
political scene of Montenegro after the departure of Slobodan Milosevic,
his political mentor.
In early morning everybody hurried to brag. "We are the winners,
because there will be no referendum", estimated Predrag Bulatovic,
president of the Socialist People's Party.
"We have made an important step forward, it is in fact an enormous step
in raising Montenegrin awareness among the citizens of Montenegro",
stressed Milo Djukanovic, Montenegrin president and leader of Victory of
Montenegro coalition.
"We are a factor that will affect the relation of political forces and
the future of Montenegro", said Miodrag Zivkovic, leader of the Liberal
League of Montenegro.
Can it be claimed that they are all right in their evaluation of the
results of April 22 elections from different angles? It seems that this
is one of the specific characteristics of Montenegrin elections and the
Montenegrin current situation. Because, apart from being a test of
strength of political parties they included an additional choice: for
the future of Montenegro in the joint state or in internationally
recognised Montenegro.
The results have shown the essential split in Montenegrin society. When
everything is summed up, the relation of forces in Montenegrin
parliament will be as follows: Montenegro - 57 per cent, Yugoslavia - 43
per cent. Expressed in the number of votes, it is slightly different:
55:45. In comparison with the situation of three years ago, the
Montenegrin block perhaps has reason to be satisfied: in January 1998,
polls showed that almost sixty per cent of the citizens supported the
idea of united FRY, and three years later - in April 2001 - more than 55
per cent declared themselves in favour of independent Montenegro.
But Together for Yugoslavia coalition also has reason to be satisfied.
Despite their fears, they are not badly beaten. On the contrary: in
comparison with their main opponent they have just two per cent less
votes. Besides, they have beaten Djukanovic in a direct duel in many
towns where he traditionally had strong support - in Niksic, Kotor and
Berane.
On the other hand, Djukanovic and his coalition partners are faced with
an even more difficult choice now. They expected a victory which would
enable them to form the government on their own and to judge whether
and when they would move toward the referendum. The victory turned out
to be very narrow, so they will have to share power with the Liberal
League. In some other times the ratio of votes Montenegro vs. FRY
(55:45) might have given joy to Montenegrin authorities. Perhaps that is
what induced Zarko Rakcevic, leader of the SDP to euphorically declare
at dawn of April 23 that "for the first time since 1918 Podgorica
Assembly, Montenegro has won".
However, it turned out that there is no large majority which would vote
in favour of Montenegrin independence. And this will have a large
influence on future steps. In short: after April elections Yugoslavia is
"clinically dead" in Montenegro, but Montenegro has not "come to life"
either. Analysts are also estimating the psychological effect of the
past elections. Had there been a large coalition, the achieved result
would have been interpreted as "a great victory of the Montenegrin
option". As it is, all the weaknesses of political protagonists have
been revealed. The first analyses show that another "purge" of the
Democratic Party of Socialists has occurred. About 15 to 18 thousand
members of DPS seem to have disobeyed the advice of the leaders of the
party and chose to vote in favour, not of the coalition of SNP, NS and
SNS, but of survival of the joint state.
That is what the situation in the field revealed. Both the authorities
and the opposition had special teams for supervision of the voting:
party activists had copies of the electoral register and copies of the
lists of party members and supporters. By a simple insight into the
number and identity of the citizens who had voted it was possible to
make an estimate of successfulness even before the end of the voting.
According to this estimate, about 20.00 h, the leadership of DPS had
very good news: an advantage of between 12 and 14 per cent in its favour
was expected, plus eight to nine per cent of the votes in favour of the
Liberal League. Only after the actual counting of the votes it became
clear that the job in the field - both before the campaign and during
the process of voting - was not done well at all: the "sure votes" were
not sure at all after all.
Now it also turned out that the projection of the propaganda campaign
had not been fully elaborated. The leaders of the DPS were indecisive
for a long time whether to persist to the very end with the story on
state independence or to insist on the story of two chairs and the union
of internationally recognised states. That is the reason why the
promotional videos did not have a clear message, but left the voters the
vague possibility to "think for themselves".
The question the leaders of DPS must answer to themselves and to others
is: have these elections definitely "cleansed" the ranks of the voters
of this party or will there be new possibilities for defection?
On the other hand, thanks to mediation of Kostunica's part of the
Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOD), leaders of Together for
Yugoslavia coalition have succeeded in overcoming their internal
disagreements. The campaign was properly conducted with a single clear
message: everybody would be better off if they did not declare
themselves in favour of independent Montenegro. DOS's media pool in
Belgrade directly helped with the posters, promotional videos and the
campaign in the field. It is estimated in Podgorica that direct
financial support (i.e. without the help of media through advertisements
in Belgrade media) amounted to 600 thousand marks.
The experience of DOS in weakening and overthrowing Milosevic's regime
has turned out to be a good mechanism although Djukanovic has maintained
power: the assistance of the new authorities in Belgrade was different
and much more efficient that at the time of Milosevic's rule when
Montenegro was threatened and when it was easy for Djukanovic to find a
winning strategy. Leading politicians in Belgrade mildly reported on all
the consequences of a possible secession of Montenegro, directing the
sharp edge primarily towards "Djukanovic's illogical and senseless
policy which leads to instability in the region" (V. Kostunica). Along
with the clear stand of the international community which is opposed to
Montenegrin independence, was the propellant of the Together for
Yugoslavia coalition in presenting the remaining in FRY as the only
logical choice for the future.
For Together for Yugoslavia coalition it would be harder to rule
because all the essential differences have come out to light. Now when
they are a respectable opposition they are in a good position to
obstruct future moves of Djukanovic and his new government with the
Liberal League.
It is more difficult to forecast what the actual order of moves will be
like. Djukanovic obviously is not in an enviable position now - the
international community will pressure him to postpone the referendum,
and the public opinion and Liberal League to hurry up with it. It is
obvious that even with a much stronger campaign Montenegrin block cannot
count on more than 58 to 60 per cent of the votes at the referendum, if
there were no boycott. If Serb-Yugoslav parties decide to boycott the
referendum, it would be very difficult to determine the real percentage
of the supporters of independence, the number of the opponents of the
idea and those who abstained from voting. The international community
will not accept such an undefined situation.
Djukanovic can hardly back out now: the option he advocates has, after
all, won the majority and that part of Montenegro expects resolution of
the state status. The negotiations with the Liberal League will be
tedious, because the Liberals have not defined clear conditions for
their joining the future government. In the campaign as well as in
previous years, DPS and LSCG had serious conflicts, and so did the
leaders of these parties, Djukanovic and Perovic. Now they must stick
together. Can they set out together and where? They will soon have to
give an answer to that question to themselves and to others.
In fact, the new administration will very easily be able to hold all
the strings in its hands. They have absolute majority in the parliament
and in 14 Montenegrin municipalities, so they can execute power
undisturbed. It is quite clear that a spectacular result in the
referendum cannot be achieved. However, the Liberal League based its
campaign on a single card: necessity of a quick referendum on the state
status. Now they would have to explain to the public the idea that time
is still not right for that and that they need several months for
preparation of the ground and execution of power to achieve it together
with Djukanovic whom they had criticised until recently for repeatedly
postponing this issue.
Therefore, what will the platform of the new-old administration be: a
quick referendum or maintaining the status quo? It seems that for the
time being not even Djukanovic himself has the answer to that question.
Drasko DURANOVIC
(AIM)
|