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SAT, 14 APR 2001 18:37:36 GMT
Comparing Aromanian, Bosniak, Macedonian and Roma -Late or Failed-
Nation-Building in the Balkans
AIM Athens, April 14, 2001
Nationalism is by its very nature an imprecise area of study. When
examining the historical development of certain nations, the student of
nationalism must address incongruent and conflicting situations that resist
simple explanation. A study of the Balkans, an area of extraordinary
diversity where identities often overlap, highlights the difficulty of
attempting to provide clear and straightforward answers to problems
associated with nationhood and the development of nationalities. The Balkan
region has undergone a history of change and turmoil over the past few
millennia, and the result of this history is a complex social and cultural
environment. Because of this complexity, no one explanation can exclusively
account for why some groups have been successful in establishing and
consolidating a national identity, and why others have not been as successful.
Despite the multifaceted nature of the Balkans, one may be able to discern
the general reasons that contributed to these developments. This essay will
argue that some common characteristics have hindered the formation of
nationhood for Aromanians (Vlachs), Bosniaks, Macedonians, and Roma, but in
the end the particular features of each group account for why nationhood
has been slow to develop among these peoples. The study will initially
discuss a few of the common aspects that have limited the possibility of
nationhood for the four groups, and will then consider each group's
individual features in relation to the difficulties of nation-building
projects.
What does "achieving nationhood" mean?
The meaning of "achieving" or "accomplishing" nationhood in relation to the
four ethnic groups mentioned above might be easily understood in a general
sense, but, when used analytically, these terms tend to obscure rather than
clarify. They should first be defined with greater precision before
determining why some groups have been less successful than others in
realizing nationhood and national identity in the Balkans. Benedict
Anderson proposes that a nation is an "imagined community" with which one
feels associated due to shared cultural elements. A national identity to a
member of this imagined community is a primary source of identity that is
mutually exclusive with the identity of other nations, meaning that as a
rule a person feels to be a member of only one nation. Additionally,
nations are most often distinguished by a commitment to a political
project, predominately to a sovereign nation-state where a nation-building
project may commence without outside interference. This essay will examine
the accomplishment of nationhood in the Balkans with the above precepts as
a theoretical guide.
Common features which have prevented nation-state formation
One feature common in varying degrees to all four ethnic groups is a high
level of geographical dispersion and ethnic intermixing. The most striking
minority in this regard is the Roma, who are mostly located roughly in the
region between Hungary and Greece in varying numbers, though always in a
numerical minority. Similarly, Aromanians are not concentrated in any one
region, but may be found interspersed among other nationalities in
present-day Albania, Macedonia, Greece, and Romania.
Yet the demographic fact of dispersion and intermixing do not completely
prevent the formation of a national identity. The majority in Macedonia has
accepted a Macedonian national identity, despite the existence of a large
number of ethnic Macedonians in Greece and Bulgaria and a sizable Albanian
community within this country. Likewise, the Bosniaks, from the period of
Ottoman rule to the present day, have always been highly intermixed among
Christian Slavs, yet Bosniak national identity is a present reality.
Certainly the dispersed and intermixed nature of these two ethnicities have
slowed their national aspirations, but the relative territorial
concentration of both the Macedonians and the Bosniaks has helped to
overcome the limitations in the formation of a national consciousness.
Another important common factor in the slow development of these
ethnicities to consolidate nationhood has been the lack of an educated
upper stratum of ethnic or religious society, what one might call a
"national elite." Jack Snyder argues that an elite is a crucial element in
the promotion and dissemination of national consciousness. According to
Snyder, an elite often utilizes symbols and stories from a shared
historical memory to generate and disseminate a national identity. A
national elite also plays an indispensable role in conveying a sense of
national distinctiveness to the outside world, a crucial factor when the
nation attempts to attain statehood or secure another type of political
project.
The four ethnic groups in consideration, however, have all been slow to
develop a national elite. Roma have historically been systematically
excluded from the societies where they are present, and as a result are
typically less educated than the majority culture in these places. The
dearth of an educated stratum has strongly hindered the establishment of a
Romani national elite. While elites do exist within Roma cultures,
traditionally they have not been national elites in the sense of promoting
the unification and consolidation of an all-encompassing Roma nation. Only
recently has such an elite emerged to promote Roma interests in these
terms. Likewise, elites in Aromanian cultures have tended to be rich
bourgeoisies who played key roles in nationhood formation for ethnic groups
other than the Aromanian itself. Although the Ottoman Empire founded an
administrative millet territory based on Vlach identity in the early 20th
Century, this did not result in the creation of a national elite to trumpet
the cause of "pan-Aromanianism."
The Muslim elites that existed in the former Yugoslavia, before that
state's formation, felt that the Islamic faith served as a primary source
of identity, though they were sometimes partial to a Croatian or Serbian
identity. After World War II, the non-Muslim Marshal Tito and the Communist
Party of Yugoslavia served as a type of "proxy" elite which concretized the
idea of a Bosniak nationality. Since both the Croats and Serbs each claimed
the Bosnian Muslims as their own people, Tito believed that the most
prudent solution to this rivalry would be to create a completely separate
nationality based on religious affiliation. A true Bosniak elite has
emerged only since the break-up of Yugoslavia to resume this
nation-building process. Regarding Macedonians, Loring Danforth claims that
they possessed a national elite in the nineteenth century which attempted
to "imagine" a Macedonian national community separate from the Greeks and
Bulgarians. As with the Bosniaks, the Yugoslav Communist elite contributed
significantly to the creation of a distinct Macedonian national identity
and culture.
Finally, all four groups have lacked consistent foreign patronage for
support in their nation-building projects. Past experience has shown that
the patronage of other nation-states or international fora can be critical
in the development of national consciousness. An independent Israel was
guaranteed by the United Nations in 1948, thus paving the way for Israeli
nation-building policies in this state. In the Balkans, Serbia attained and
maintained independent statehood from the Ottoman Empire in the late
nineteenth century largely due to the Russian Empire. Romania also claimed
a sovereign state and expanded its territory after World War I thanks to
France's support for the Romanian national cause. International patronage
allowed the means for these nations to establish a sovereign territory,
from where they could consolidate a sense of national consciousness.
The four cultures considered here generally have obtained only weak or
inconsistent foreign patronage. No large nation or international body has
ever strongly promoted the cause of the Romani nation. The Aromanians have
received some support from Romania as a Latin-speaking kin, but this
support has been limited, and moreover, not all Aromanians look to Romania
as a patron. Certain Islamic states in the Middle East have provided
patronage and support to Bosniaks only during and after the war in Bosnia
in the 1990s. Macedonians received international support for their national
cause only in the course of the break-up of the former Yugoslavia. Since
the international community generally recognized that Yugoslavia was in the
process of dissolution along internal administrative borders, with the
significant exception of Greece, it passively accepted the inevitable
reality of an independent Macedonian state.
Individual characteristics which have prevented nation-state formation
* Macedonians
Due to turbulent history and geopolitical surroundings, the Macedonians
developed a national identity later than most other "successful"
nationalities in Central and Eastern Europe. The Ottoman Empire's millet
system of administrative division by religious belief had a strong hold on
the mentality of the peoples in this area. As a result of this emphasis on
religion, for many years the most important form of identity for the Slavs
in current-day Macedonia was an affiliation with Orthodox Christianity.
When the concept of nationalism spread throughout Europe in the
mid-nineteenth century, it failed to have the effect of creating a distinct
Macedonian national identity. One important reason why this did not occur
may have been the lack of an autocephalous Orthodox Church in Macedonia,
which had been instrumental in generating national identity in Greece and
Bulgaria. Moreover, the neighboring Serbs, Bulgarians and Greeks carried
out nation-building policies in this period, and each attempted to claim
the people now known as Macedonians as part of their own respective
nations. Consequently, by the start of the twentieth century, most
Macedonians considered themselves to be ethnic Bulgarians.
By recognizing Macedonian as a constituent nation of Yugoslavia in the
1940s, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia helped accomplish the Macedonian
national identity, expressly for political purposes. Gradually that
distinct national identity developed and spread into the mentality of the
Slavic people living in the present area of Macedonia, where it is now
entrenched. Although a latecomer to the nationalism process, Macedonian
nationhood is as valid as any other long-established national identity.
* Bosniaks
Like the Macedonians, the consequences of the Ottoman millet system had
great significance for the Bosniaks. For most of their history, Muslims in
Bosnia and the Sandzak did not ascribe to the ethno-confessional term
"Bosniak," as the Islamic faith and its related culture instead were
primary sources of identity for people who lived in this region. The
establishment of Yugoslavia, a decentralized state for southern Slavs, had
a decisive effect on spreading a Bosniak national identity in the twentieth
century. Hugh Poulton writes that the concept of a Bosniak nation was
"enhanced through state policies." The Bosniaks essentially saw their
ethnic group transform into a nation in the Yugoslav state, since Tito
found it politically expedient to create a new nationality to reconcile
Croat and Serb claims that the Bosnian Muslims were part of their
respective nations. Following World War II, Tito gradually granted greater
recognition to Bosniak nationhood, culminating in the classification of
Bosniaks as a separate -Muslim- "nation" within Yugoslavia in 1981.
However, Bosniaks found this source of identity targeted during the Bosnian
war of 1992-1995 by Serbs and Croats, who endeavored to physically
eliminate all Muslims within Bosnia and Herzegovina. The war served as a
powerful nation-building tool for the Bosniaks, and effectively solidified
the sense of a distinct national identity for them.
* Aromanians
The Aromanians (Vlachs) have been able to reconcile the peculiarities of
their ethnicity with the national identities in the states where they live,
and as a result have never forged a separate Aromanian national
consciousness. In other words, the Aromanians could speak their own
Latin-based language and live their own way of life, yet not feel as if
this were in conflict with the culture of the majority. Aromanians have
also tended to conceal their identity from the majority culture and easily
assimilate with others around them. Thus Aromanian never "competed" with
other nations as a primary source of identity, as the Macedonian identity
did (and still does) with Serbian, Greek, and Bulgarian identities in the
20th Century.
Aromanian expert T.J. Winnifrith reveals a startling observation from his
travels among this people: Aromanian culture appeared most pronounced to
him when Aromanians themselves were least aware of being "Aromanian."
Surprisingly, it appears that, with the Aromanians, greater contact and
awareness of difference with others tends to lead to Aromanian assimilation
or integration with the majority culture, not to more pronounced ethnic
consciousness.
Apparently, then, the question is not why Aromanians have been slow to
develop nationhood, but rather why Aromanians have resisted complete
assimilation, and why a detectable Aromanian identity still persists in
terms of unique linguistic and cultural features. Perhaps elements of their
culture persist because many Aromanians have tended to remain physically
apart from other cultures due to a proclivity to live in remote,
mountainous regions and practice a transhumance way of life. This relative
seclusion from the rest of the world has occasionally created a sense of
awareness of difference for the Aromanians, although this has not
translated to the need for an Aromanian national identity. Equally
important, a sense of "Aromanian-ness" never demanded primary importance,
allowing Aromanians to feel comfortable in a nation-state in which they are
not in the majority.
* Roma
Many factors are prominent in explaining why the Roma have been slow to
develop a national identity. First of all, the Roma are not one singular
homogenous entity, but are a diverse, complex people who vary widely by
language and religious affiliation. Some Roma speak the language of the
majority culture where they live as their primary language, and others
maintain one of many Romani languages in their communities. Because of this
diversity, few Roma think of themselves as belonging to a wider "nation"
that exists outside of their own community. Moreover, many Roma have
historically tended to be nomadic, which has led to their geographical
dispersion throughout Europe and the lack of any place that could
conceivably be a "homeland" for them.
Furthermore, throughout history the Roma have typically been excluded from
mainstream society in the areas they have been living. Majority cultures
invariably "ghettoize" them, resulting in widespread discrimination in all
facets of life and limited educational opportunities for Roma children. The
Roma's status as perpetually outside the mainstream society, coupled with
their extreme diversity and nomadic character, have all contributed to
their difficulties in achieving nationhood. However, Roma elites have
recently begun to emerge and demand recognition from the European Union and
other international actors as a specific nationality. One likely reason why
nationhood has developed for Roma, as distinct from Aromanians, may be
because the latter group was able to assimilate into the majority culture,
while the marginalization of the Roma has led to their use of the national
concept to further Roma interests.
In summary
Aromanians, Bosniaks, Macedonians and Roma have similar features which have
limited the formation of a national identity and national consciousness,
such as a tendency to be geographically dispersed and intermixed with other
nationalities, the slow development of a national elite, and the lack of
international patronage. Each also possesses particular characteristics
which have had an even greater effect on the formation of a separate
national identity.
It must be stressed, though, that nationalism and nation-building is a
process, not a finished product. One relevant example in this regard
concerns the Roma, as representatives of Romani have recently begun a
nation-building process to unite their disparate peoples in Europe. Whether
they or the other cultures discussed here will succeed in consolidating a
permanent national identity, or eventually become assimilated into other
cultures, is still to be determined.
--------------------------------------------
* Steven D. Nelson is a M.A. student in the Nationalism program of the
Central European University (Budapest). This is an edited version of his
final essay for the seminar "States and Minorities in the Balkans," offered
by AIM Athens editor Panayote Dimitras.
Steven D. Nelson*
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